Arquitectura preventiva contra copamiento político local: evidencia internacional transferible
Preventive Architecture Against Local Political Capture: Transferable International EvidenceContenido principal del artículo
Este estudio examina el clientelismo como mecanismo habilitador del copamiento estatal local e identifica prácticas preventivas internacionales transferibles a municipios peruanos. Mediante revisión sistemática PRISMA con búsqueda booleana (“clientelism” AND “prevention”) en ScienceDirect, Scopus y SciELO, se analizaron 192 registros iniciales, incluyendo finalmente 11 estudios tras cribado metodológico. Los hallazgos convergen en dos ejes preventivos principales: auditorías ciudadanas con reglas exigibles de acceso informativo y sistemas meritocráticos blindados que limiten discrecionalidad en recursos humanos. Complementariamente, se identifican ocho líneas operativas piloteables con indicadores verificables: control concurrente en emergencias, licenciamiento estándar, observatorios ciudadanos, controles diferenciados por proceso, servicio civil meritocrático con bandas salariales, reforma administrativa con métricas, desintermediación y blindajes preelectorales con supervisión rotativa.
This study examines clientelism as an enabling mechanism for local state capture and identifies transferable international preventive practices for Peruvian municipalities. Through systematic PRISMA review with Boolean search (“clientelism” AND “prevention”) in ScienceDirect, Scopus, and SciELO, 192 initial records were analyzed, finally including 11 studies after methodological screening. Findings converge on two main preventive axes: citizen audits with enforceable information access rules and protected merit-based systems limiting human resources discretion. Additionally, eight operational lines pilotable with verifiable indicators are identified: concurrent emergency control, standard licensing, citizen observatories, process-differentiated controls, meritocratic civil service with salary bands, administrative reform with metrics, disintermediation, and pre-electoral safeguards with rotating supervision.
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